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Abstract 
 
In the past few years, the world has witnessed an unprecedented popular backlash against 
international institutions. Popular demands to not only slow down, but to reverse international 
integration have proliferated, and have resulted in referendum and election outcomes that have 
reverberated across the world. Examples range from the Swiss 2014 mass immigration initiative 
over the British 2016 Brexit referendum to the 2016 election of a US President seemingly 
determined to withdraw US support from various international treaties. The implications of 
these mass-based disintegration efforts reach far beyond the countries in which they originate. 
First, the disintegration process is shaped by how remaining member states respond to one 
member’s bid to unilaterally change or terminate the terms of an existing international 
agreement. Second, mass-based disintegration bids also pose considerable risks of political 
contagion by encouraging disintegrative tendencies in other countries. Yet despite their 
disruptive nature, very little research exists beyond individual case studies on the general 
drivers, dynamics and challenges these instances of mass-based disintegration pose for 
international cooperation. This paper therefore engages in a comparative inquiry into the mass 
politics of disintegration that pays particular attention to the strategic dilemmas these instances 
pose for the affected international institutions and their remaining member states. It argues that 
the remaining member states have incentives to intervene in domestic campaigns in which 
disintegration figures as a viable outcome, but that the difficulties of successful intervention are 
considerable. It also shows that after a vote in favor of disintegration, the remaining member 
states face an “accommodation dilemma” between preserving as many cooperation gains as 
possible and making exit costly in order to discourage other member states from following suit.  
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1. Introduction 
In the past few years, the world has witnessed an unprecedented popular backlash against 
international institutions. Faced with increasing trade-offs between the gains from international 
cooperation, democracy, and national sovereignty (Rodrik 2011), popular demands to not only 
slow down, but to reverse international integration have proliferated. The most prominent 
example of such an instance of “mass-based disintegration” is the 2016 Brexit referendum in 
the United Kingdom (UK), in which British voters decided to leave the European Union (EU). 
This direct democratic vote has set in motion the biggest withdrawal negotiations ever seen in 
an international organization. Although highly disruptive and unusual, Brexit is, however, not 
unique. Voters in Greece, Iceland, and Switzerland have used popular referendums to repudiate 
the terms of existing international agreements in recent years. And US President Trump has 
fulfilled key campaign promises by withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accord and initiating 
renegotiations of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) agreement. Scepticism about 
the merits of international cooperation is nothing new (see for examples the overviews in 
Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Kuo and Naoi 2015). But the vehemence with which it has 
manifested itself more recently is a new development.  
The consequences of mass-based efforts of disintegration reach far beyond the countries in 
which they originate. Not only is the disintegration process significantly shaped by how the 
other member states respond to one member’s bid to improving its membership terms – a 
change that typically leaves the others worse off. Mass-based disintegration bids by one 
member state also reverberate among the mass public in other countries, because they are highly 
politicized, perceived as legitimate, and receive a lot of attention both at home and abroad. For 
example, after the Brexit referendum vote, euphoric Eurosceptics across Europe, from France’s 
Marine le Pen to the Slovak People's Party-Our Slovakia, called for similar referendums in their 
own countries. And across the Atlantic, then-candidate Donald Trump tweeted that British 
voters “took their country back, just like we will take America back.”1 Similarly, the leaders of 
Spain’s Podemos or Italy’s Five-Star-Movement celebrated Greece’s 2015 referendum-based 
bid for a more generous bailout package, raising fears that it would spark similar demands in 
other Eurozone crisis countries.  
Mass-based disintegration thus poses considerable risks of political contagion by emboldening 
integration-sceptics elsewhere. Not surprisingly, this phenomenon is widely seen as a serious 
                                                        
1 Tweet from June 24, 2016 
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threat to international cooperation. The Economist has warned that the “politics of anger” might 
lead to an unravelling of globalization and the prosperity it has created (The Economist 2016). 
This concern is shared by academics, who have argued that growing popular support for 
disintegration poses a fundamental challenge for international institutions such as the EU 
(Hobolt 2016; e.g., Blyth 2016) and the contemporary liberal world order more generally (e.g., 
Ikenberry 2018; Pepinsky 2017; Rodrik 2017). However, political contagion does not always 
occur. For example, public support for the EU has increased since the Brexit referendum 
(Eurobarometer 2017) and popular appetite to leave the Paris Accord has not spread to other 
countries. 
Against this backdrop, it is imperative to better understand how mass-based attempts to revert 
integration spread, how they can be contained, and which dynamics they produce in the 
international arena. In short, we need a better understanding of the mass politics of 
disintegration and their implication for international relations. However, our theoretical tools 
to do so are underdeveloped. There is vast research on the creation and functioning of 
international institutions2 (for overviews, see e.g. Martin and Simmons 2013; Pevehouse and 
von Borzyskowski 2016; Gilligan and Johns 2012), but analysis of how such institutions 
disintegrate has remained rudimentary (for notable exceptions, see Helfer 2005; von 
Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2018; Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996; Helfer 2017). For 
example, in the Oxford Handbook of International Organizations (Cogan, Hurd, and Johnstone 
2016), none of the 55 chapters focuses on the dissolution of international organizations. Even 
in research on the European Union, where scholars have had to grapple with the challenges of 
popular Euroscepticism for some time (Hooghe and Marks 2009), a theory of European 
disintegration remains elusive (Börzel 2018). Scholars agree that disintegration is not 
“integration in reverse”, but not on much else (Vollaard 2014; Jones 2018; Webber 2013; 
Rosamond 2016). A better understanding of the causes, dynamics, and consequences of 
international disintegration is thus urgently needed (Schneider 2017). 
This paper works towards this goal by a more systematically exploring the mass politics of 
international disintegration. It first conceptualizes mass-based disintegration as a specific type 
of international disintegration. It then examines the challenges – both normative and practical 
– that mass-based disintegration efforts in one member state present to international institutions 
and the remaining member states. Section 3 focuses on the period before a relevant vote, 
                                                        
2 I define international institutions as relatively stable sets of norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors 
in the system and their activities (Duffield 2007). They cover a spectrum that ranges from international treaties to supranational 
organizations. 
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whereas section 4 focuses on the aftermath of a mass-based disintegration decision. The final 
section discusses the long-term challenges that the mass politics of disintegration pose for 
international cooperation. Throughout the paper, I draw on evidence from several recent mass-
based disintegration processes in Europe.  
 
2. What is Mass-based Disintegration? 
I define mass-based disintegration as a process in which a member state of an international 
institution attempts to unilaterally change or terminate the terms of an existing international 
agreement on the basis of a strong popular mandate. It aims at disintegration because it seeks 
to partly or fully withdraw from the rules of an international institution, such as an international 
agreement or an international or supranational organization. It is mass-based because it is 
grounded in strong domestic popular support, for example through a referendum vote or as part 
of a successful candidate’s election campaign. This not only provides the disintegration 
decision with a high degree of democratic legitimacy, but also politicizes the question of 
whether an international treaty can be changed ex post or terminated among the other member 
states (Zürn 2014; Hutter, Grande, and Kriesi 2016). Mass-based instances of disintegration 
therefore tend to be much more politicized and salient in the political debate than disintegration 
decisions taken by a small foreign policy elite.3 Mass-based disintegration should be seen as a 
process. Its starting point is domestic integration scepticism, but it acquires an international 
dimension as soon as the national government takes up this mounting domestic pressure to 
negotiate better membership terms with the other member states. If the other states do not 
accommodate such a request, the process can accelerate: the disintegrating state officially 
announces its intention to partially or fully withdraw from the international institution, 
negotiates the terms of withdrawal, and ultimately withdraws from specific rules or the entire 
international institution. Of course, the process can also end along this way, if the disintegrating 
state backs down. 
Figure 1 shows that mass-based disintegration efforts have proliferated in the recent decade. It 
focuses on referendums, the clearest form of mass-based disintegration efforts and distinguishes 
between “integration referendums” that establish or deepen cooperation between states and 
“disintegration referendums” that, if successful, roll back existing forms of international 
cooperation. The graph distinguishes two types: Exit referendums are about terminating 
                                                        
3 For a discussion of these latter instances, see von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2018). 
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membership in an existing international institution. The Brexit-referendum is the most 
prominent example of this category, but another example is the 2014 Swiss ECOPOP 
referendum, which called for the termination of any international treaty that limits 
Switzerland’s ability to limit immigration. A second type of disintegration referendums are 
non-compliance referendums which, if successful, force the government to not comply with 
certain provisions in existing international agreements. One example is the 2016 Hungarian 
refugee quota referendum, which aimed at not implementing an EU decision to relocate asylum 
seekers across all European Union member states. Another example is the 2015 Greek bailout 
referendum. 
Figure 1: Number of integration and disintegration referendums, 1970-2016 
 
Source: C2D Datenbank, Zentrum für Demokratie Aarau, updated by myself for recent years. 
Notes: Own classification of all national referendums on questions concerning international cooperation. 
 
Figure 1 shows that while referendums aimed at international disintegration are still relatively 
rare, they have become much more frequent and much more dominant in recent years. Six of 
the ten disintegration referendums held so far and almost all ‘successful’ ones (i.e. resulting in 
a disintegrative vote) have been held since 2014.4 Moreover, populist leaders across Europe 
have called for more disintegration referendums, so that the number may continue to grow. It 
is not a coincidence that these referendums are mostly directed against the EU, which has 
                                                        
4 The non-compliance referendums are the 2000 Brazil IMF referendum, the 2014 Swiss “Against Mass 
Immigration” initiative, the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, the 2016 Swiss Implementation Initiative, and the 
2016 Hungarian refugee quota referendum. The withdrawal referendums are the 1975 UK referendum on 
continued EC membership, the 1984 Greenland referendum on leaving the EC, the 1986 Spanish referendum on 
continued NATO membership, the 2010 and 2011 Icesave referendums, the 2014 Swiss ECOPOP initiative, and 
the 2016 British Brexit referendum.  
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achieved a level of integration that makes the trade-offs between national sovereignty, 
democracy and international cooperation gains particularly pronounced (Rodrik 2011). 
Mass-based disintegration efforts by one member state create considerable challenges for the 
remaining member states, both before and after the “disintegration vote.” First, the loss of a 
member state weakens the institution’s overall economic and political clout. Second, ex post 
changing the terms of an international agreement to one country’s benefit tends to leave the 
remaining member states worse off, because international agreements are usually the result of 
mutually beneficial compromises (e.g., Keohane 1984; Abbott and Snidal 1998). Disintegration 
therefore leads to the loss of existing cooperation gains. It reintroduces barriers to cooperation 
that the international institution had hitherto removed, and thus is costly both in economic and 
more general efficiency terms. For example, if disintegration leads to the re-introduction of 
trade barriers, exporters in both the remaining members and the leaving state will be hurt and 
international supply chains will be disrupted. This is likely to cause job losses and economic 
downturns in both the leaving state and the remaining members. Other forms of cooperation 
and policy coordination between the remaining countries and the leaving country – from police 
cooperation to environmental protection – are also likely to become more difficult. This creates 
transaction costs, economic distortions, and also financial risks that arise as economic agents 
adjust to the new disintegrated environment. Finally, successful disintegration also raises the 
risk that additional member states will emulate this move, thus putting the institution’s long-
term viability in question.5  
Given these negative externalities, policymakers in the other member states need to confront 
the question of how to respond to one member state’s unilateral, mass-based disintegration bid. 
The remainder of this paper examines the challenges and dilemmas they confront in this regard 
both before a disintegration vote (section 3), and after such a vote (section 4).  
 
3. Challenges for foreign policymakers before the vote 
The best case scenario for policymakers who are confronted with a referendum or election 
campaign abroad that could generate negative externalities at home is a voting outcome in 
which disintegration is rejected by a popular vote. When faced with a disintegration referendum 
in another member state or an election in which integration-sceptic candidates have a good 
                                                        
5 This political contagion effect has been well documented in the context of secessionist movements on the 
national level (Walter 2006b; 2006a; Coggins 2011). 
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chance of winning (such as in the recent US and French presidential elections), domestic 
policymakers thus have a strong preference for foreign voters to vote against disintegration or 
in favor of continued integration. This creates incentives for them to get involved in what would 
normally be regarded another country’s domestic affairs: a foreign election or referendum 
campaign.  
Because the response of the remaining member state to a popular vote in favor of 
disintegration strongly determines how such a vote would ultimately play out for the 
disintegrating country, voters should be interested in learning about the likely response in 
advance. This gives foreign policymakers an opportunity to convey their likely reaction to a 
disintegrative vote. They can use a variety of strategies to communicate their opinion and 
resolve during the election or referendum campaign. Least intrusive, foreign policymakers can 
try to coax voters in the other country to vote in favor of continued cooperation, for example 
by emphasizing the value of continued membership, making normative appeals and promising 
future benefits. However, they can also take a more aggressive stance, for example by warning, 
or even threatening, voters about the negative consequences of a disintegrative vote. Finally, 
they can actively intervene in the campaign, such as European policymakers did in the run-up 
to the 2015 Greek bailout referendum when they cut off Greece from additional financing 
during the referendum campaign. Increasingly, foreign involvement in domestic campaigns 
also occurs in more decentralized forms via social media (Sevin and Uzunoğlu 2017).6  
Such foreign interventions in domestic elections or referendum campaigns raise both 
normative and practical questions. In normative terms, foreign interventions in domestic 
referendum and election campaigns, especially in its more active forms, violate the principle of 
non-interference in domestic affairs and thus conflict with national sovereignty. Yet, as 
democratically elected leaders, foreign policymakers are also tasked to represent the interests 
of their citizens. From this viewpoint, interventions in a foreign campaign with the intention to 
protect the country’s own voters from harm may be legitimate. These normative questions about 
the legitimacy of foreign campaign interventions are difficult to resolve. 
Intervening in a domestic disintegration referendum campaign from abroad also poses practical 
challenges. Such intervention is no easy feat, because foreign policymakers face obstacles with 
regard to the credibility, the effectiveness, and the costs of such interventions (Walter et al. 
2018). Because foreign policymakers act in the interest of their own country, their interventions 
                                                        
6 Such direct foreign interventions in domestic elections have been rare among Western democracies, but were more common 
during the Cold War and still are relatively common in developing country elections (see for example Corstange and Marinov 
2012; Levin 2016). I am not considering the outright illegal forms of foreign interventions seen in the recent US elections and 
Brexit campaign here. 
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in domestic election campaigns may not be credible or effective. Positive foreign messages can 
easily go unheard in a heated domestic campaign. With regards to warnings, foreign 
governments face private information and time-inconsistency problems that make it particularly 
difficult for them to credibly communicate their resolve not to accommodate a non-cooperative 
vote (Fearon 1995). Because non-accommodation also imposes costs on those other countries 
themselves, their pledge to punish such a vote ex post may suffer from credibility issues and 
may therefore not be taken seriously by domestic voters. What is worse, they can also backfire 
if voters perceive them as an undue interference in domestic affairs (Shulman and Bloom 2012). 
As such, foreign interventions may not be very effective.  
To illustrate this problem, consider the 2016 Brexit campaign in the UK: Because of the large 
risks that Brexit posed for the European integration project, EU and EU-27 policymakers had a 
strong interest in a ‘remain’-outcome in the referendum. Yet, they were rather hesitant to get 
too strongly involved in the Brexit campaign because it was feared that given the widespread 
British distrust towards to EU, such interventions might strengthen, rather than weaken, the 
Leave-camp (Glencross 2016).  
More generally, evidence collected during the campaign illustrates the difficulties for foreign 
policymakers in influencing expectations, beliefs, and vote intentions in such a setting. To 
examine how warnings by foreign policymakers influence respondents’ expectations in a 
disintegration referendum campaign, I conducted a survey experiment with 1778 respondents 
in Britain about two weeks before the 2016 Brexit referendum.7 All respondents were informed 
that “after a referendum vote to leave the EU, Britain and the EU [would] have to negotiate an 
agreement about their future relationship.” Respondents were then randomly given one of four 
different treatments, in which a domestic (The Remain Campaign) or a foreign (the Belgian 
Prime Minister, the President of the EU Commission, or the US president) had “warned that 
the EU will only sign such an agreement if it makes Britain worse off compared to where it 
stands now.”8 Respondents were then asked about their expectations about a potential post-
Brexit world, such as whether such an agreement would make the EU and the UK better or 
worse off,9 whether the UK would lose access to the EU’s single market, whether such an 
agreement would leave the UK worse off economically, or whether the UK would have less 
                                                        
7 Data are from an original YouGov online poll, fielded on June 7, 2016, N=1778. Data are weighted. 
8 A fifth control group were not given any warning. Adding the control group in the analysis does not 
substantively change the results presented below. 
9 “Compared to today’s relationship, how do you think this new agreement would look? A new arrangement 
would be worse for both Britain and the EU/ worse for Britain and better for the EU/ better for Britain and worse 
for the EU/ better for both Britain and the EU.” 
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influence in international negotiations than as an EU member.10 For the analysis belowm I 
recoded the answers to these questions into dummy variables that take the value of one for more 
pessimistic expectations.  
Figure 2: Survey Experiment: Effects of threats by different foreign actors on 
expectations 
 
 
Based on logit analyses that control for gender, age, political attention, social grade, education, 
referendum vote intention, figure 2 shows the marginal effects of each of the treatments on the 
likelihood that a respondent has a more negative expectation regarding the foreign response to 
a Leave-outcome in the June 2016 Brexit referendum, with 95% confidence intervals.11 
Although warnings by foreign policymakers, especially European politicians, did make voters 
somewhat more pessimistic, these effects were rarely statistically significant. Warnings 
attributed the US president made voters even more optimistic at times, underlining the difficulty 
                                                        
10 “In the run-up to the referendum, we have heard many different arguments about what would happen if the UK 
were to leave the EU. For each of the following scenarios, how likely do you think that this scenario will come 
true if Britain votes to leave the EU in the referendum?: If Britain votes to leave the EU, Britain will …negotiate 
an agreement with the EU that leaves it worse off economically than it is today. … lose full access to the EU’s 
single market. … have less influence in international negotiations than as a EU member.”  
11 Results are the same when I only control for the referendum vote intention, which had been elicited at an 
earlier point in the survey 
Remain Camp
Belgian PM
EU Comm. President
US president
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15
Marginal effects
New EU-UK agreement will be worse for UK UK will lose single-market access
UK economy worse less international influence
Note: Controlling for gender, age, social grade, education, referendum vote intention
In the run-up to the referendum, there have been many different arguments about what would happen
if the UK were to leave the EU. For each of the following scenarios, how likely do you think that this scenario
will come true if Britain votes to leave the EU in the referendum?
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of the task. Figure 2 thus shows how difficult it is for foreign policymakers to sway public 
opinion in disintegration referendum campaigns. 
Faced with these difficulties of signaling their resolve, another way for foreign policymakers 
to increase the credibility of their interventions is to send costly signals about their 
determination not to accommodate a voting outcome that would harm their own citizens (Walter 
et al. 2018). To be effective, however, these signals have to carry considerable costs, without 
any guarantee that this investment will pay off. A prominent example is the referendum 
campaign leading up to the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, in which Eurozone policymakers 
intervened to an unprecedented degree. The bailout referendum tried to force Greece’s creditors 
to give it better terms on a bailout agreement for the crisis-ridden country by rejecting the 
existing offer through a referendum vote. An accommodation of Greece’s wishes would have 
fundamentally changed the EMU crisis management mode, which is why the other Eurozone 
member states were adamantly opposed to a Greek exception. However, they were at the same 
time highly exposed to the consequences of the referendum: A rejection of the bailout 
agreement (a “no”-vote) was feared to result in “Grexit”, and hence a break-up of the Eurozone, 
which European policymakers had tried to avoid throughout the Eurozone crisis (Copelovitch, 
Frieden, and Walter 2016). As a result, European policymakers strongly intervened in the Greek 
campaign, warning that a Greek no-vote would not result in better terms for a new bailout 
package, but rather result in Greece’s exit from the Eurozone. After all, Grexit was also an 
outcome which a strong majority of Greeks did not want.  
To underline their resolve, European policymakers resorted to a clear demonstration of their 
determination not to accommodate a referendum vote against the bailout agreement on offer. 
When the existing bailout agreement expired during the referendum campaign, they refused to 
extend it for a few days. The ECB also declined Greece’s request to increase emergency 
liquidity assistance to Greek banks. These decisions forced the Greek government to close the 
banks and to become the first developed country to ever default on an IMF loan early on in the 
referendum campaign. The costs of this European signal of resolve were immense, not just for 
Greece, but also for the other Eurozone governments. They caused enormous economic 
damage, which at least doubled the amount Eurozone governments ultimately had to invest in 
a third bailout package for Greece. 12  
                                                        
12 see http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/06/economist-explains-5 and 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/index_en.htm 
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Did this costly signal convince Greek voters of Europeans resolve? Evidence collected by 
Walter, Dinas, Jurado and Konstantinidis (2018) shows that right before the vote, a majority of 
Greeks believed that a non-cooperative referendum outcome would result in continued 
negotiations, whereas only about one quarter thought that a No-vote would lead to Grexit. Thus, 
the foreign intervention in the Greek referendum campaign failed to convince Greek voters of 
the European resolve not to accommodate a negative vote. Nonetheless, Figure 3 shows that 
the intervention on net did sway about 10% of Greek voters away from voting no and towards 
voting yes.13 Given the huge costs, this is a rather meagre result. Ultimately, the foreign 
intervention did not succeed in changing the referendum outcome in favor of a cooperative 
outcome. 
Figure 3: Effect of the Greek bank shutdown on average support for the bailout proposal 
(cooperative outcome) in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, based on 33 polls on 
referendum vote intention. 
  
Note: Each dot/triangle represents a poll published during the referendum campaign. The blue curve denotes local 
average estimates, shaded areas denote 95% confidence bands. Figure is from Walter et al (2018: Figure 7). 
 
Overall, this discussion has shown that intervening in other countries’ election or referendum 
campaigns is a tricky path for policymakers, both for practical reasons and for legitimacy 
concerns.  
 
                                                        
13 Survey evidence suggests that about 12% of voters switched from No to yes, but about 4% also hardened their 
position and switched from yes to now (Walter et al. 2018). 
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4. Responding to successful disintegration referendums: the Accommodation 
Dilemma 
How can the other member states of an international institution respond if voters in one member 
state have cast a popular vote in favor of disintegration? This question once more poses 
significant challenges for the remaining member states.  
For one they are confronted with normative questions: Is it undemocratic not to implement the 
democratically expressed wish of (one) people? Or is it undemocratic to implement a policy 
that produces negative externalities for others without asking them about it? The fierce criticism 
of the EU’s “undemocratic” response to the Greek bailout referendum, embodied in the hashtag 
#thisisacoup, illustrates the appeal of the first position.14 The hashtag made the round on twitter 
after Greece had been forced to accept a third bailout package in the post-referendum 
negotiations. This third bailout came with harsh conditionality, the very thing Greek voters had 
just rejected in the referendum. Critics thus argued that by not accommodating the Greek 
referendum vote, the remaining EU member states had shown a disrespect for democracy, 
staging in fact a “coup” against democracy. Eurozone policymakers countered this argument 
by emphasizing that they had been elected to represent their own citizens’ interests, not 
Greece’s, and that their citizens would be worse off if a Greek vote could force them to 
accommodate their demands.  
In addition to these normative questions, however, the question of how to respond also presents 
policymakers with a practical “accommodation dilemma”. How the disintegration process 
evolves, and whether the country pursues or aborts its disintegration request, depends to a large 
degree on the other member states of the international institution. The latter can choose from a 
wide array of possible reactions, but confront a trade-off between maximizing their short- to 
medium-run well-being and maintaining the long-run stability of the international institution. 
On the one hand, the remaining states can accommodate the democratically expressed wish of 
the other people, e.g. by granting the exceptions demanded or by maintaining wide-ranging 
post-withdrawal cooperation with the withdrawing state. Such post-disintegration arrangements 
limit the disruptions implied by a sharp rupture in the hitherto cooperative relations. By 
accommodating the referendum country, the material costs of disintegration can thus be 
decreased for everyone involved. However, although an accommodation strategy preserves the 
benefits from cooperation as far as possible, it also comes with two significant downsides. First, 
because international agreements are usually the result of mutually beneficial compromises 
                                                        
14 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/13/greek-supporters-social-media-backlash-germany 
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(e.g., Keohane 1984; Abbott and Snidal 1998), changing the terms of such an agreement to one 
country’s benefit ex post tends to leave the remaining member states worse off.  
Second, and perhaps more consequentially, accommodation carries considerable risks of 
political contagion because it demonstrates that countries can unilaterally improve their position 
through mass-based disintegration bids. For voters, it is generally difficult to correctly predict 
how one’s country would fare if it left an existing international institution. Voters can compare 
their own country relative to others to imagine such a counterfactual situation, for example by 
benchmarking their country’s economic performance (e.g., Gärtner 1997; Hobolt and Leblond 
2009; Hobolt and Leblond 2013), or national political system (Rohrschneider 2002; e.g., 
Anderson 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Armingeon and Ceka 2013; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). But 
such national benchmarks are imperfect proxies, especially because so much depends on the 
nature of the future relations between the withdrawing state and the members of the 
international institution. Voters tend to understand this strategic complication (Christin, Hug, 
and Sciarini 2002; Finke and Beach 2017; Hobolt 2009; Dinas et al. 2017), but for lack of a 
realistic counterfactual often misperceive the strategic incentives of the other member states. 
Some voters therefore imagine their country’s post-integration future in too rosy a color (e.g., 
Milic 2015; Owen and Walter 2017; Sciarini, Lanz, and Nai 2015; Walter et al. 2018), and such 
optimism makes voters more willing to risk breaking apart from an international organization. 
For example, more than 90 percent of Greek voters who rejected the bailout agreement in the 
2015 referendum expected their vote to result in continued negotiations and a better bailout 
package (Jurado, Konstantinidis, and Walter 2015), and two thirds of “Leave”-voters in the 
Brexit referendum believed that the UK would retain full access to the EU’s single market post-
Brexit (Owen and Walter 2017). 
By observing another country’s efforts to disintegrate from a common (or similar) international 
institution, voters can update these beliefs. Another country’s disintegration experience thus 
provides voters with a powerful counterfactual that allows them to assess more accurately to 
what extent disintegration presents a viable and better alternative to membership in the 
international institution (de Vries 2017; Walter 2017). It informs voters about the likely 
response of the other member states and of the likely economic, social, and political 
consequences of disintegration. A disintegration experience that improves the situation of the 
withdrawing country demonstrates that integration can be reversed and that nation states can be 
better off on their own. This creates an “encouragement effect” that makes successful 
disintegration of one member state “socially contagious” (Pacheco 2012). By observing this 
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experience, voters in other countries become more optimistic about national prospects outside 
the international institution, which encourages the spread of disintegrative tendencies abroad.15 
Such a diffusion of disintegrative tendencies among the institution’s remaining members, 
however, threatens the long-run viability of the international institution as a whole.  
These political contagion risks in turn create incentives for the remaining member states to 
pursue a hard, non-accommodating strategy that inflicts high costs on the withdrawing 
country.16 When the disintegrating country fails in its efforts to change or leave the international 
institution, voters in other countries equally update their beliefs: Observing that a country is 
worse-off post-disintegration (or aborts its disintegration bid for fear of negative consequences) 
is likely to make them more pessimistic about their own country’s post-disintegration future. 
Such a “deterrence effect” should thus decreases voters’ enthusiasm for an exit of their own 
country. Beyond the effect on disintegration support, the encouragement and deterrence effect 
are also likely to influence how voters evaluate the international institution and the merits of 
international cooperation more generally (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012; Clements, Nanou, and Verney 
2014).17 It may therefore be in the remaining members’ and the institution’s interest to make 
non-compliance or withdrawal so costly for the withdrawing country, that it prospectively helps 
to discourage similar mass-based efforts at disintegration in other member states. Because it 
also makes withdrawal very costly for the disintegrating state, this strategy moreover raises the 
probability that the latter will reconsider its bid to not comply or withdraw (as the Swiss and 
the Greek ultimately did at the end of the negotiations with the EU and the remaining member 
states). The downside of the non-accommodation strategy is, however, that it is likely to be 
costly for everyone involved.18 
A unilateral, mass-based bid for disintegration thus creates an accommodation dilemma that 
puts the national governments of the remaining states into a strategically difficult situation in 
which public opinion features both as a constraint on and an outcome of the disintegration 
negotiations. The Brexit example illustrates the accommodation dilemma nicely. While 
granting the UK continued access to the EU’s single market would maintain existing economic 
                                                        
15 This effect has also been well documented in the context of secession on the national level (e.g., Coggins 2011). 
16 An example for a non-accommodation strategy is the EU’s reaction to Switzerland’s referendum vote in 2014 
to restrict immigration and subsequent decision not to extend freedom of movement to nationals of a new EU 
member state (Croatia) in violation of its bilateral treaties with the EU. The EU retaliated by barring Switzerland’s 
access to the new Horizon 2020 research program, which eventually succeeded in convincing the Swiss parliament 
not to implement the referendum and to honor its obligations enshrined in the bilateral treaties. 
17 These effects are not limited to voters in other countries, but may extend to voters in the leaving state – who 
may update and potentially change their preferences as the true benefits or costs of disintegration are revealed. 
18 The rationale for this strategy is thus not dissimilar to the logic of economic sanctions (Martin 1993). 
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ties and preserve many cooperation gains in the other member states, the remaining EU-27 
member states are weary that such a response might put the entire European project at risk in 
the long run by creating incentives for other countries to defect as well. In contrast, the non-
accommodation strategy might dampen others’ incentives to leave the EU, but would come at 
a high economic price for both the UK and the remaining member states (e.g., Chen et al. 2017).  
 
4.1 Assessing the risks of political contagion 
The rationale for a non-accommodation strategy vis-à-vis the referendum country in the 
disintegration negotiations rests on the expectation that such a hard line will have a deterrence 
effect that limits the potentially centrifugal effects of political contagion. This raises the 
empirical question whether this expectation is warranted: Does a hard, non-accommodating 
bargaining position indeed discourages further disintegration in the remaining member states? 
This question applies to two levels of analysis, the country-level and the individual-level. On 
the country-level, the question is to what extent an accommodation of referendum-induced non-
compliance or disintegration encourages other governments to seek exceptions for their own 
countries. The country-level problems are relatively well understood, especially when it comes 
to non-compliance (Simmons 2010). I therefore here focus on the individual-level, which has 
become increasingly important in recent years, especially in Europe (Hooghe and Marks 2009; 
Hobolt and de Vries 2016).  
A rigorous test of this hypothesis would require a dynamic analysis of how individuals respond 
to disintegration negotiations and outcomes, and how this feeds back into their own support for 
an international institution and demands for disintegration. While such an analysis would 
ideally be based on a huge and longitudinal (preferably panel) data collection effort, which I 
am currently engaged in, I here present some preliminary data that uses correlational evidence 
from the Brexit case to examine whether individuals take the fate of a disintegrating country 
into account when forming an opinion about whether they themselves support disintegration of 
their own state. To this end I use data from an EU-wide online poll that Dalia Research 
conducted on my behalf in July 2017 on public opinion across 28 EU Member States (see also 
S. Walter 2017b). The sample consists of 9371 working-age respondents (ages 18-65), drawn 
across the remaining 27 EU Member States,19 with sample sizes roughly proportional to their 
                                                        
19 I omit the UK for the analysis.  
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population size. In order to obtain census representative results, the data were weighted based 
upon the most recent Eurostat statistics.20  
Respondents’ support for disintegration of their own country from the EU was measured with 
the question “If [YOUR COUNTRY] were to hold a referendum on leaving the EU today, how 
would you vote?”. The possible answers ranged from “I would definitely vote to leave the EU 
(1) to I would definitely vote to remain (4). I then examine how assessments about the likely 
effect of Brexit on the UK are associated with the propensity of respondents to support an exit 
of their own country from the EU. I use the question “Five years from now on, do you think 
Brexit will make the UK much better off/somewhat better off/neither better nor worse 
off/somewhat worse off/much worse off?” Of course, this opinion will be strongly influenced 
by what respondents’ attitudes about the EU. I therefore control for the respondent’s general 
opinion of the EU, using the question “What is your opinion of the EU? Very negative/Somewhat 
negative/Neither negative nor positive/Somewhat positive/Very positive”. Because research has 
shown that Euroskepticism is a multidimensional concept (Hobolt and de Vries 2016), I 
additionally control for respondent’s views about the EU’s competences: “Which statement best 
describes your views about the future of the European Union? The EU should return some 
power to national governments/The division of power between national governments and the 
EU should remain as it is today/National governments should transfer more power to the EU.” 
I additionally control for some sociodemographic variables (age, gender, education, whether 
the respondent lives in a rural or urban setting, and country).  
Figure 4 shows the marginal effects from an OLS regression on the likely vote in a national exit 
referendum in the respondent’s own country. It demonstrates that both a deterrence and an 
encouragement effect are at play: Those who assess the UK’s prospects outside the EU more 
pessimistically are less likely to vote for an exit of their own country from the EU. Likewise, 
those who think that the UK will do well after it has left the European Union are also more 
likely to potentially vote leave if their own country held an exit referendum. This effect holds 
even after two different dimensions of EU-related opinions are controlled for. Not surprisingly, 
a possible disintegration vote is strongly influenced by these opinions. Nonetheless, the likely 
effect of Brexit on the UK exerts an additional effect on respondents’ vote intentions. 
 
 
                                                        
20 The target weighting variables were age, gender, level of education (as defined by ISCED (2011) levels 0-2, 3-
4, and 5-8), and degree of urbanization (rural and urban). Results are robust to using only the data from the biggest 
five countries, whose sample sizes exceed N=1000. 
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Figure 4: Deterrence and encouragement effects of Brexit 
 
Figure 5 shows that deterrence and encouragement effects can also be observed when we split 
up the sample according to people’s opinion of the EU. This suggests that the accommodation 
dilemma exists. Nonetheless, future research should explore in more detail whether a tough 
negotiating stance indeed influences voters’ expectations and perceptions about the likely 
consequences of disintegration for their own country. 
Figure 5: Deterrence and encouragement effects of Brexit, by EU opinion 
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4.2 Country-level variation in responses to disintegrative referendum votes 
The contagion risks associated with one member state’s withdrawal from an 
international institution are not just the outcome of the disintegration negotiations, but 
themselves influence these negotiations.21 These negotiations will be fundamentally shaped by 
the accommodation dilemma, the trade-off between the costs of a non-accommodative strategy 
and the contagion risks implied by an accommodative strategy. The contours of this dilemma 
and the extent to which it shapes international disintegration negotiations is likely to vary across 
member states and disintegration cases, however.  
First, countries weigh the costs of non-accommodation more heavily when the potential 
costs of this strategy to the domestic economy and society are high. The net costs of 
disintegration are usually distributed unequally among member states and also differ across 
different issues. They are highest when a member state depends strongly on cooperation with 
the disintegrating state, and when its ability to potentially benefit from opportunities created by 
disintegration is low. This exposure to non-accommodation can vary considerably: a “hard 
Brexit,” for example, is estimated to put less than 0.5% of Slovakia’s and Bulgaria’s GDP, but 
more than 10% of Irish GDP at risk (Chen et al. 2017). I would expect that states will be 
particularly hawkish on issues on which their net domestic costs of non-accommodation are 
small, but more dovish on issues where non-accommodation is very costly for their domestic 
economy and society.  
Second, political contagion risks influence national negotiating positions. Because the 
bargaining outcome is likely to have significant spillover effects on the support for the 
international institution in all remaining member states, public opinion moves in the spotlight 
of the disintegration negotiations. Feedback effects between international negotiations and 
domestic public opinion are well known in international relations research (e.g. research on 
two-level games (Putnam 1988), audience costs (Tomz 2007; e.g. Fearon 1994) or the role of 
domestic politics for international politics more generally (Moravcsik 1993; Moravcsik 1997; 
e.g. Milner 1997)). In addition to these vertical linkages between voters and their governments, 
however, the contagion effects in disintegration negotiations mean that policymakers need to 
consider the contagion risks in other member states and in the withdrawing country (diagonal 
linkages) in parallel with the political contagion risks in their own country (vertical linkages). 
                                                        
21 Note that the bargaining mandate can also be exercised by representatives of the international institution as such, 
as the EU did in the negotiations about the implementation of the Swiss mass immigration initiative. But because 
the bargaining outcome needs to be ratified by the remaining member states if it suggests substantive changes to 
the existing agreement, member state positions will be influential in these instances as well. 
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The higher the contagion risks in at least one member state, the more hawkish governments’ 
negotiation positions will usually be overall. This means that even if a government represents 
a country in which the mass public strongly supports continued membership, it will opt for a 
non-accommodating strategy if it fears that accommodation will encourage integration-sceptics 
in another remaining member state. High contagion risks at home or in another member state 
thus increase support for a non-accommodation strategy. This effect will be particularly 
pronounced when the disintegration process is highly politicized. And because ideas also matter 
in international negotiations (e.g., McNamara 1998; Risse 2004), more integration-sceptic 
governments will be less concerned about contagion risks.  
Third, non-accommodation can be very costly, but also increases the likelihood that the 
withdrawing state might back down – generally the best outcome for the remaining states. This 
suggests that the remaining member states have stronger incentives to pursue a non-
accommodative strategy vis-à-vis the disintegrating state when there are nontrivial chances that 
such a strategy will result in a retraction of the disintegration bid. This is most likely when the 
bargaining power of the remaining states is high. The level of bargaining power depends on a 
number of factors (Finke et al. 2012; Thomson et al. 2006; Moravcsik 1997; Bailer, Mattila, 
and Schneider 2015; Keohane and Nye 1977). The leverage of the remaining members tends to 
be higher when the number of remaining member states is high, when the interdependence 
between the disintegrating and the remaining member states is asymmetric and in favor of the 
latter (Keohane and Nye 1977), and when non-accommodation means continuing the status quo 
(Schimmelfennig 2017). Relative bargaining power also depends on the institutional setup of 
the withdrawal process, frequently specified in the form of exit clauses (Rosendorff and Milner 
2001; Kucik and Reinhardt 2008; Pelc 2009) that disadvantage the withdrawing state. Finally, 
the remaining member states also have more bargaining power when their preferences are 
homogenous with regard to a certain issue. For example, the ranks will be much more closed 
on issues such as continued financial contributions of the withdrawing state – which virtually 
all states are likely to favor – than on issues such as preferential market access, where positions 
are likely to be much more divided.  
Against this backdrop, one would expect the remaining member states to vary in their responses 
to a disintegration referendum. Research examining and explaining this variation so far barely 
exists, but some observations stand out: First of all, the choice of strategy depends on the 
relative bargaining power of the concerned parties. For example, the EU is engaging with the 
UK’s wish to leave the EU, whereas it refused to even officially open negotiations about a 
potential treaty change with Switzerland. This partly reflects the fact that the UK has a much 
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larger economy and is more deeply integrated with the EU-27 countries than Switzerland. 
Likewise, Canada and Mexico have agreed to open renegotiations of the NAFTA agreement, 
even though they have been less willing to accommodate the United States’ demands to 
improve the agreements terms only in the latter’s favor.  
Second, the remaining member states vary in their degree of unity in disintegration negotiations. 
In the negotiations following the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, for example, Eurozone 
governments were split in their opinion about whether Greece should be allowed to leave (or 
be kicked out of) the Eurozone. In contrast, in the Brexit negotiations, the remaining EU-27 
countries have shown a high degree of unity in the Brexit negotiations so far. However, the 
negotiations to date have covered aspects of Brexit on which there is little debate among the 
EU-27 – for example, everybody is in favor of the UK paying more. Figure 6a shows the 
positions of the remaining member states on the issues discussed so far, based on assessments 
of national negotiation positions made by the Economist Intelligence Unit (The Economist 
2017). However, figure 6b, which considers a larger range of issues in the Brexit negotiations, 
including, for example, security, shows considerable variation in the long-run Brexit-approach 
among the remaining EU member states.  
Figure 6a:  
Brexit positions, negotiation phase I 
Figure 6b:  
Overall Brexit negotiation positions 
  
 
5. Conclusion: Mass-based disintegration, a democratic threat to the liberal world 
order? 
The recent successes of populist parties, candidates, and initiatives have often been based on a 
common narrative: that by being more assertive in international relations and putting the 
nation’s interest first rather than accepting compromise, the country’s prosperity, national 
very soft
very hard
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sovereignty, and democratic quality could be improved. Upon closer inspection, however, these 
promises have usually proven to be built on quicksand. Successes at the domestic polls have 
been met with resistance abroad. Renegotiating international agreements has proven difficult, 
if not impossible, and has sometimes forced populist governments to concede that the status 
quo is better than what they could achieve if they left such an agreement. Although these 
setbacks have decreased the appeal of such messages to some extent (de Vries 2017), they still 
garner considerable support.  
This paper has demonstrated that so far, mass-based attempts to unilaterally change or withdraw 
from the rules of international cooperation have not failed because of poor negotiation skills on 
part of the governments of the withdrawing states, but because they invoke a central trilemma 
in international relations: Rarely do the trade-offs between international cooperation, 
democracy, and national sovereignty (Rodrik 2011) move into the spotlight more prominently 
than when one country votes on an issue in which other countries equally have a large stake.  
Yet the failure of populist promises to materialize bears its own risk. When governments tasked 
with implementing populist referendum outcomes have not been able to deliver the promised 
lands of milk and honey, they have been decried by populists as incompetent or unwilling to 
implement the will of the people. Resistance of foreign governments against one country’s 
wishes for unilateral change has been condemned as a lack of respect of democracy. And 
because intergovernmental bargaining tends to take place between a relatively small number of 
few government officials behind closed doors, its outcomes have often been characterized as 
elitist decisions by bureaucrats who have lost touch with normal people. There is thus a risk 
that the failure of mass-based disintegration initiatives breeds even more resentment and 
feeding ground for populists. Dealing with this democratic threat to the liberal world order is 
no easy task. It is important, but not easy, for policymakers to communicate clearly the trade-
offs and constraints under which they operate. They also need to straddle the rope between 
accommodating too much and risking contagion on one hand, and accommodating too little and 
risking backlash on the other. Only one thing is certain: it is impossible to ignore this challenge 
to international cooperation from below. 
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